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Augmenting the Intuitive Logics scenario planning method for a more comprehensive analysis of 
causation 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows the standard approach to scenario planning, known as 
µ,QWXLWLYH/RJLFV¶WREH, in practice, overly-focused on uncovering cause 
RIRQH W\SHNQRZQDV µHIILFLHQWFDXVH¶:H outline and apply a broader 
consideration of cause, leading to a more sophisticated analysis of 
uncertainty. 2XUIRFXVLVRQLQFRUSRUDWLRQRI$ULVWRWOH¶VQXDQFHGDQDO\VLV
of causation. We incorporate the features of our augmented scenario 
development approach in a practical step-by-step methodology and draw 
out several implications for expert knowledge elicitation. 
 
Keywords: scenario planning; causation; uncertainty; Intuitive Logics; complexity 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Scenario planning is a technique for thinking about the future that is widely employed by business and 
government organizations. It is designed to broaden and challenge the perspective of decision-makers, 
allowing them to reconsider the standard DVVXPSWLRQ RI µEXVLQHVV-as-XVXDO¶ (van der Heijden, 2000; 
van der Heijden et al., 2002).  
 
In a review of the literature, Wright et al. (2013) found that the three main objectives of the application 
of scenario methods are: i) Enhancing understanding: of the causal processes, connections and logical 
sequences underlying events ² thus uncovering how a future state of the world may unfold; ii) 
Challenging conventional thinking: to reframe perceptions and change the mindsets of those within 
organizations; and iii) Improving decision-making: to inform strategy development. Wright et al. 
(2013) emphasize that understanding the connections, causal processes, and logical sequences which 
determine how events may unfold to create different futures, will challenge conventional thinking and 
will also prove of benefit in improving organizational decision-making and strategy. 
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As such, scenario methods are often qualitative rather than quantitative in approach and are targeted at 
providing, side-by-side, alternative views of the nature of a broad-brush future - where these views are 
elicited from problem experts within a scenario team. This approach contrasts sharply with the 
common purpose of expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) methods, in which the focus is to quantify 
H[SHUWV¶VLQJOH-point-HVWLPDWHVRIXQFHUWDLQTXDQWLWLHVZLWKVRPHH[SHUWV¶MXGJPHQWVSRWHQWLDOO\EHLQJ
given more weight in the combination (c.f., Morgan, 2014, Aspinall, 2010, Bolger and Rowe, 2015).  
Another difference between the scenario approach and typical EKE yields is that in scenario planning 
WKHUH LV QRREMHFWLYH VWDQGDUGE\ ZKLFK WR FDOLEUDWH WKHYDOLGLW\RI LQGLYLGXDO H[SHUWV¶ MXGJPents. In 
scenario planning, the focus is often on the distant future and the scenarios themselves are not forecasts 
but very different alternative plausible futures that are intended to µERXQG¶ the range of future 
possibilities ± with each individual scenario (if thought of as an intersection of many events) having an 
infinitesimal likelihood of occurrence. Additionally, scenario planning combines individual expert 
opinion informally, often within a workshop setting. In such situations, the scenario team faFLOLWDWRU¶V
role is to generate divergence of opinions before, finally, facilitating convergence of opinions into, 
usually, four scenario storylines. See Wright and Cairns (2011) and Wright et al. (2013) for more detail 
on the scenario method.   
 
There are a number of alternative approaches to scenario planning (see Bradfield et al., 2005), but by 
far the most commonly applied is that known as µ,QWXLWLYH/RJLFV¶,/± see Schwartz (1997), Foster 
(1993), and Vanston et al. (1977) for examples of the diversity within the IL approach. IL is a 
plausibility-based approach enabling participants, usually within a workshop setting, to create 
narratives describing unfolding chains of causation - which resolve into sets, usually four, of distinct 
future outcomes (Goodwin and Wright, 2010; Phelps et al., 2001). Because it is based on plausibility, 
rather than probability or projection, a key advantage of IL over forecasting is argued to be its ability to 
facilitate WKH PDQDJHPHQW WHDP¶V consideration of challenging futures (Wright and Goodwin, 2009, 
Wright and Cairns, 2011). 
 
Bradfield et al. (2005) identified four main areas of purpose in scenario work: making sense of a 
particular puzzling situation; developing strategy; anticipation; and adaptive organizational learning.  
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The flexibility of the IL method lends itself to a wide range of scenario purposes - either descriptive or 
normative - the scope of which can be extremely broad, as in the development of global scenarios, or 
narrow, if focussed on the viability of a single focal organization. See Wright and Cairns (2011) for the 
impRUWDQFHRIFOHDUO\GHILQLQJDQ µLVVXHRIFRQFHUQ¶ at the start of any scenario enquiry. The present 
SDSHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQLVIRFXVVHGRQWKHFDXVHVRIWUDQVIormation in the business environment and so our 
arguments and conclusions are, in our view, applicable to all purposes inherent in scenario work. 
 
IL¶V DELOLW\ WR GHOLYHU effectively on the benefits of both understanding causality and of challenging 
business-as-usual thinking has recently been questioned (Wright et al., 2013). Additionally, IL has been 
shown to be deterministic (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014) in that µsurprise¶ futures that have no salient 
FDXVDO OLQNDJH WR SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ SUHVHQW YLHZSRLQWV DUe not considered. Reflecting this inherent 
determinism, IL has been shown to increase focus on, what may be, the scenario workshop 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ overly-narrow perspective on the full range of plausible futures (Wright et al., 2013). 
Finally, the IL method has been shown to lead to increased confidence in views of causality that may 
be mistaken (Wright and Goodwin, 2009). 
 
The present paper argues that many of these problems stem from a contradiction at the heart of IL. 
Namely, it is purportedly a technique for thinking about the future which eschews prediction. Yet its 
foundations, in practice, can be viewed as being built upon a predominant focus on cause of one type, 
NQRZQ DV µHIILFLHQW FDXVH¶ As we shall argue, this over-focus on efficient cause is one of the main 
factors leading IL to narrow decision-PDNHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYHVRQWKH range of plausible futures, rather than 
broadening perspective on the future, as intended.  
 
We argue that to resolve this contradiction it is necessary to rethink the IL approach to developing 
scenarios such that it does not narrow perspective by focusing on only one type of cause. A nuanced 
and sophisticated grappling with the inherent uncertainty of the future requires consideration of as full 
a range of different types of cause as possible, and requires us to be aware of the conditions under 
which identified causes lead to unexpected outcomes, because of contingent conditions or 
countervailing factors. We outline the underpinning logic for, and practical application of, 
4 
 
augmentations WRWKHFXUUHQWµVWDQGDUG¶DSSURDFKWR,/ to enhance analysis of causality. Our focus is on 
LQFRUSRUDWLRQRI$ULVWRWOH¶VQXDQFHGDQDO\VLVRIFDXVDWLRQ 
 
In the next section of this paper, we provide an overview of the conventional IL scenario development 
process and demonstrate its reliance on identification of efficient cause. In the third section, we show 
the limitations of this focus. In the fourth section, we demonstrate how scenario development 
methodology can be augmented to take into consideration a much broader set of causes. Finally, in 
sections five and six, we develop and demonstrate a practical augmented IL scenario development 
process which incorporates the broader cause set. Our paper thus contributes to enhancing an analysis 
of cause within the scenario process. 
 
2 The current foundations of scenario development 
 
7KHµVWDQGDUG¶IL approach to scenario development 
 
While there are many different approaches to scenario construction, Postma and Liebl (2005) have 
VKRZQWKHSUHGRPLQDQWDSSURDFKWREHWKDWNQRZQDVµ,QWXLWLYH/RJLFV¶,/,QOLQHZLWK5DPLUH]DQG
Wilkinson (2014), in the present paper ,/LVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµVWDQGDUG¶DSSURDFKWRVFHQDULRSODQQLQJ 
 
In chronological order, the approach, at Stage 1, requires the scenario team members to identify an 
µLVVXHRIFRQFHUQ¶ and then, at Stage 2, to identify predetermined elements and critical uncertainties. 
Identification of these is initiated by asking the scenario team to consider, in turn, each of the six 
PESTEL dimensions (political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal). These 
separate driving forces ± often over 200 in number in a typical scenario exercise (c.f., van der Heijden 
et al, 2002, Wright et al, 2009, Bradfield et al., 2015) ± are then re-FRPSRVHGLQWRFOXVWHUVRIµUHODWHG¶
forces, at Stage 3. This clustering is achieved across the PESTEL dimensions by linking individual 
IRUFHVE\µDUURZVRILQIOXHQFH¶DVLOOXVWUDWHGLQ)LJ 
 
In this way, causally-linked clusters of elements are generated and named, that are, to a large degree, 
independent of one another. Stage LVWRGHILQHWZRµH[WUHPH¶ but plausible sets of outcomes for each 
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of the clusters. Stage 5 is to identify those cluster headings whose content is both: (i) of high impact on 
the focal issue of concern (usually the viability of the host or focal organization), and (ii) of high 
uncertainty. At Stage 6, the two cluster headings that combine (a) the greatest impact and (b) 
uncertainty over what that impact will be, aUHVHOHFWHGDVWKHµVFHQDULRGLPHQVLRQV¶WKDWDUHXWLOLVHGWR
produce four detailed scenarios ± developed with a common, temporal, starting point but ending in four 
diverse, yet plausible, causally-unfolded end-states. (A full illustration of the practicalities of each of 
these six Stages, and their outcomes, is given in tutorial fashion in Wright and Cairns [2011] - for 
space-saving, we do not rehearse this material here). It is after this point that scenario development 
may focus on stakeholder analysis ± what would each of a set of stakeholders (e.g., competitors, 
regulators, customers, suppliers, etc.) do as a particular scenario unfolds in order to preserve or enhance 
their own interests (van der Heijden et al., 2002)? This optional ingredient of the scenario mix is 
perceived as adding a degree of realism to the scenarios. If the focus of the scenario exercise is strategy 
development, another stage is WR HYDOXDWH WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V VWUDWHJLHV SUHYLRXVO\ NHSW VHSDUDWH Dnd 
distinct) against each of the scenarios. Is a particular strategy robust against a range of scenarios, or is it 
fragile against some? This focus often leads to: (i) re-design of strategic options or, more 
fundamentally, (ii) re-design of the success formula of the organization. 
 
 
    INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
It can be seen that the emphasis in scenario planning is on uncovering the causal nature of the 
unfolding future. As Burt et al. (2006) note, scenarios are not predictions, extrapolations, good or bad 
futures, or science fiction. Instead, they are purposeful stories about how the contextual environment 
could unfold in time and they consist of the following: 
 
1 A description of a future end state in a horizon year ± That is, the combinations of 
uncertainties and their emergent resolution in the final point in time in a particular 
scenario story.  
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2 An internally consistent account of how a future world unfolds ± That is, an explanation 
based on causal logic of how a particular scenario unfolds from the past to the present to 
the future. The story will represent the dynamic interplay of predetermined elements and 
resolved uncertainties, showing how these factors interconnect and impact each other, 
revealing their logical consequences.    
 
Wright and Cairns (2011) document such causal analysis using data from a recent scenario planning 
intervention, conducted by one of the present authors, in a major EU bank involved in residential 
mortgage lending in the last quarter of 2007. Two cross-disciplinary clusters that were viewed, by the 
PRUWJDJHEXVLQHVV¶VHQLRUPDQDJHUV to be both (i) of the highest uncertainty and (ii) the highest impact 
RQ WKHEDQN¶VRSHUDWLRQV were illustrated. One cluster evidenced WKHEDQN¶V FRQFHUQ ZLWK UHVLdential 
house price rises ± a factor which was seen to be a pre-determined trend ± and the effect on mortgage 
DSSOLFDQWV¶ DELOLW\ WR VHUYLFH WKHLU GHEWV 7KH YLHZ ZDV WKDW WKHVH ERUURZHUV ZRXOG EH DWWUDFWHG Wo 
µPXOWL-JHQHUDWLRQDO PRUWJDJHV¶ where the debt is passed down to succeeding generations. A second 
cluster evidenced WKH EDQN¶V FRQFHUQV ZLWK PRUWJDJH SURGXFWs being offered by supermarkets, since 
these retailers already offered savings accounts and credit cards. In short, and importantly from the 
perspective of the present paper, conventional application of the IL methodology made no prompted 
DQDO\VLVRIZKDWLQWKHVFHQDULRSDUWLFLSDQWV¶YLHZVFRXOGUDGLFDOO\ WUDQVIRUPWKHEDQN¶Vthen-current, 
mortgage-lending activity to make it more, or less, successful. 
 
 
Scenario planning is thus designed to be an organizationally based social-reasoning process based on 
GLDORJXH DQG FRQYHUVDWLRQ WR VKDUH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI WKH HQYLURQPHQW DQG WR IDFLOLWDWH
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ LQWHUDFWLRQV DV WKH\ HQJDJH LQ D process of sense-making through theory building and 
storytelling. Emphasis within the elicitation procHVVLVVLPSO\RQLGHQWLI\LQJµFDXVH¶+RZHYHU cause, 
in practice, is left undefined (c.f., van der Heijden et al., 2002, Wright et al., 2009, Bradfield et al., 
2015) and, as such, workshop participants use the profferHGµarrows of influence¶ in an unsophisticated 
simplistic way, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, i.e., loosely and without specific direction by the 
workshop facilitator.  
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It is noteworthy that DQµDUURZRILQIOXHQFH¶GRFXPHQWVWKDWWKHRXWFRPHRIone particular (i.e., part of 
a cluster) driving force (positioned at the start of an arrow) occurs earlier in time and influences the 
resolution - as an outcome - of the particular driving force that is positioned at the point of the arrow, 
representing a point later in time. There is then a further arrow leading from this resolved driving force 
to a subsequent one which is still later in time, and so on, until an end-point is realised. Thus a cluster 
of driving forces potentially represents, in the abstract, several sequences of future outcomes. IL, then, 
is based on constructing a series of cause-and-effect relationships leading to individual sets of future 
outcomes, in time-ordered sequence. The type of causation in which something occurring earlier 
precipitates and brings about something else occurring later in time, in a chronological sequence of 
cause-and-effect (van den Heijden, 2000), is known DVµHIILFLHQWFDXVH¶+RFXWW 
 
This - perhaps natural and unthinking - emphasis on forces as efficient causes shows IL practice to be 
aligned with the Newtonian perspective on IRUFHVUHIHUUHGWRDVµ1HZWRQLDQPHFKDQLFV¶ZKLFKDVLWV
name implies, views systems as operating in an inherently mechanical fashion (Orrell and McSharry, 
2009; Byrne, 2002). Newtonian mechanics has its origins in nineteenth century physics, in which it was 
conceived as a system for identifying how objects move under the influence of force (Byrne, 2002). As 
evident in the use of calculus in modern-day neoclassical economics, which is also founded in 
mechanics (Mirowski, 1989)WKLVDSSURDFKWRUHDVRQLQJDVVXPHVWKDWLIDV\VWHP¶VFXUUHQWFRRUGLQDWHV
in state space can be pinpointed with sufficient accuracy, its future coordinates - and, indeed, all its past 
coordinates - can be known (Orrell and McSharry, 2009; Makridakis and Taleb, 2009; Byrne, 2002). 
This implies that a unique set of input coordinates leads to a single, unique outcome in terms of the 
future position of the system, making prediction possible. For example, positions within the planetary 
system can be predicted, over time, with precision (Makridakis and Taleb, 2009). 
 
8QGHU1HZWRQLDQPHFKDQLFVDSDUWLFXODUSRLQWLQDV\VWHP¶VWUDMHFWRU\OHDGs to a particular subsequent 
point, in a sequential (and entirely reversible) fashion. Each future position of the system is therefore 
fully determined and fully reflective of its current position, and there is only one, unique path to each 
individual future position of the system. Similarly, in IL each developed scenario represents a single set 
of antecedent (driving) forces, each leading to a distinct, individual outcome via sequences of cause-
and-effect relationships ZKHUHE\ HDFK µUHVROYHG¶ FDXVH (i.e., driving force) precipitates another 
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outcome in the chain until the sequenced outcome of the chain is realised. In Figures 1 and 2, such 
sequences of cause-and-effect relationships are illustrated. Note that in the µefficient cause¶ perspective 
on causality, kQRZOHGJHRIWKHFKDLQ¶VFDXVHVLPSOLHVNQRZOHGJHRIWKHFKDLQ¶s ultimate outcome and, 
logically, identification of an µearly warning¶ or µweak signal¶ is possible (Derbyshire and Wright, 
2014; Ramirez et al., 2013; Schoemaker et al., 2013). Here, an µearly warning¶ would be the occurrence 
of a particular outcome at an early point in the pre-identified, sequenced chain of driving forces. 
 
In recent years, there KDVEHHQDVWURQJJURZWKLQµhorizon-scanning¶ activities and functions in many 
organizations ± see for example, horizon scanning for the UK¶s and other health organisations1. But, 
others have viewed such activities as less than straightforward. For example, Poli (2010a, 2010b) has 
persuasively argued that systems (in our case individual actors or societal structures ± the latter 
including regulation, laws, etc.) make, or contain predictions of the future in their current 
decisions/formulations. Similarly, the non-orthodox economist G.L.S. Shackle (2010) wrote widely on 
the role of expectation in current decision-making. Thus, anticipated future states influence the current 
state of a system, in contradiction to Newtonian models.  
 
2.2 ,/¶VFRQWUDGLFWRU\IRXQGDWLRQV 
 
In our analysis (c.f., Wright and Goodwin, 2009), the future is not driven solely by the systemic actions 
of driving forces abstracted from a PESTEL checklist (c.f., the standard IL scenario development 
methodology, above). The future also involves the actions of human beings, as they react to the 
unfolding of outcomes. Human action, or inaction, adds complexity to understanding the ways in which 
the future might unfold. But this realisation of the primacy of self-interested human action/intervention 
is a quite recent addition to the scenario literature (c.f. Wright and Goodwin, 2009; Cairns et al., 2010). 
In short, standard IL, as currently constituted and outlined earlier, is grounded in foundations that 
imply prediction. We will further analyse this inherent determinism, as well as the problem of over-
emphasis on efficient cause, in the next sections of this paper. 
 
                                                 
1 Horizon scanning exercises conducted for the UK National Health Service, World Health 
Organisation and other health-related bodies: http://www.cfwi.org.uk/our-work/horizon-scanning 
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We argue that ,/¶VFXUUHQW IRXQGDWLRQVneed to be re-thought and augmented with measures taken to 
mitigate the negative and bias-inducing effects of an over-focus on identification of efficient cause. We 
show that this can be achieved by enhancing the current standard IL process using concepts (and 
derived practical steps) from $ULVWRWOH¶VSKLORVRSK\RIFDXVH$ULVWRWOH. We clear the ground for 
that discussion by further developing our analysis of the positive and negative aspects of scenario 
SODQQLQJ¶V FXUUHQW HPSKDVLV RQ identifying perceptions of efficient, cause-and-effect relationships as 
evident in the multi-stage standard approach, set out above. We then highlight alternative 
understandings of µcause¶ which, when incorporated into a practical scenario-creation process, provide 
for a more comprehensive analysis of causation. 
 
3 Standard scenario planning and causation 
 
3.1 Positive aspects of a focus on efficient cause 
 
The process of constructing several sets of efficient cause-and-effect relationships is, in itself, 
beneficial as it will provoke participants to consider futures other WKDQµEXVLQHVV-as-XVXDO¶ ± i.e., other 
than an extrapolation of the present into the future. Essentially, this re-framing effect is brought about 
WKURXJKZKDWLVFDOOHGWKHµVLPXODWLRQKHXULVWLF¶ which Tversky and Kahneman (1983) have shown to 
occur when people are asked to create a narrative scenario about the future. When individuals simulate 
(imagine) a causally-connected chain of outcomes, the resulting set of time-sequenced outcomes (i.e., a 
particular scenario) is perceived psychologically as much more likely to occur than the probabilities 
attached to the occurrence of the individual outcomes allows, according to the intersection probability 
law.  
 
The simulation heuristic is the basis on which IL has its positive, perspective-broadening effect since 
each constructed scenario (i.e., a set of sequences of outcomes) stands in contrast to a simple 
extrapolation of the present, yet each scenario is perceived as a plausible unfolding of its constituent 
events. The simulation heuristic is an integral part of the effectiveness of the IL process and a 
foundation stone supporting its usefulness as a tool for considering alternative futures. This heuristic is 
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invoked in fully-developed scenarios by the use of narratives describing the distinct sets of outcomes as 
chains of efficient causes. 
 
3.2 Negative aspects of a focus on efficient cause 
 
3.2.1 Determinism 
 
This positive, perspective-broadening effect from the use of efficient cause in the standard IL approach 
to scenario planning is, however, balanced by several negative effects. Counter-intuitively, these act to 
narrow UDWKHUWKDQEURDGHQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVSHFWLYHVRQWKHIXWXUHAs we have discussed, the use of 
unfolding chains of efficient cause renders each scenario individually determined. Each outcome 
precipitates the next in a sequential, deterministic manner, resulting in a single set of future outcomes 
(Phelps et al., 2001; Raubitschek, 1998). Since each driving force may have more than one possible 
outcome (c.f., Stage 4 of the standard IL approach, described earlier), four sets of such outcomes are 
the essential basis for the construction of four separate, individually-determined scenarios. 
 
But this simplicity in construction acts to give the misimpression that each end-state of a scenario has a 
single set of antecedent causes. For example, the end-state of the cluster in Figure 1 is a particular 
µlevel of growth of inner-city housing in Glasgow¶, UK. As a result, application of the standard IL 
methodology gives the misimpression that all that is necessary to avoid undesirable futures - when such 
is an end-state - is to be alert to the occurrence of a particular sequence of events and, upon noticing 
such an unfolding, to take action to avoid the undesirable outcome described by the scenario. Indeed, as 
we have discussed, this is the logic which lies behind the current emphasis on µweak signals¶ or µearly 
warnings¶ in both the scenario-planning literature and in organisational horizon-scanning functions 
(Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; Ramirez et al., 2013; Schoemaker et al., 2013).  
 
For example, Schoemaker et al. (2013) considered the issue of how scenarios can be more oriented 
towards recognising and responding to µweak signals¶ ± i.e., trigger events that indicate and initiate the 
unfolding of a causal chain of events - in the external environment. These authors argued that the 
contemporary, highly networked, organization has extensive points of contact with the external world 
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and how, whilst expanding the opportunities for recognition of emergent opportunities and threats, this 
also presents the threat itself of leaving the organization unable to spot useful signals amongst the 
µavalanche of data¶. They outlined an approach to seeking such useful signals amongst background 
noise based upon the adoption of a µstrategic radar system¶ and they illustrated the approach with a 
brief case study of a large government agency. In a similarly-focussed approach, Ramirez et al. (2013) 
used case examples from Nokia and Statoil to document the relationship between scenario development 
and the monitoring of early warning signals in the business environment. In their case analysis, these 
authors explored the degree of synergy between these two activities and argued that the combination of 
activities can create potential competitive advantage by providing a continuous strategic service to top 
management, in contrast to the discontinuity often inherent in a sequence of scenario exercises. 
 
But, in our analysis, not only are there multiple possible futures, there are also multiple possible paths 
to each future. Each future end-state, such as a particular µlevel of growth of inner-city housing in 
Glasgow¶, has multiple possible sets of antecedent causes. Application of IL does not preclude the 
identification of multiple causal sets of antecedent causes but, importantly, this realisation that there 
may be multiple possible sets of paths to a single future is unrecognised within practical application of 
the IL approach to scenario development, where identification of a single set of causal relationships is 
the focus of elicitation and analysis (Wright et al., 2009) ± and has no emphasis in all the other 
approaches to scenario development that we have reviewed (Bradfield et al., 2005). Crucially, it 
follows that since there are multiple possible sets of paths to any particular future, actions designed to 
sensitise an organisation to the early trigger events that initiate a single causal set of relationships that 
result in a particular (un)desirable future ± so-called µhorizon-scanning¶ functional units ± are 
misplaced. Uncertainty associated with the future, then, is much more complex than implied by IL in 
its standard format with its practice-based focus on efficient cause. As we shall see, ,/¶V IRFXV RQ
efficient cause renders it overly deterministic and thus only capable of facilitating a simplistic analysis 
of uncertainty. 
 
In a similar emphasis on inappropriate simplification, Miller (2007, 2011) and  Rhisiart et al. (2014) 
make the point that we should not attempt to make probabilistic predictions of the future via 
high/medium/low variations on a single theme ± VXFK WKDWZHGRQRWDWWHPSW WRµFRORQLVH WKHIXWXUH¶ 
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with our perceptions of the present-day. Slaughter (1998, 1999) and Ahlqvist and Rhisiart (2015) also 
argue that in developing scenarios we should be aware of the simplifying µparadigmatLF¶ assumptions 
and world-views that are prevalent in particular Futures methodologies - in our view, this includes the 
very basic causal analysis we have highlighted within the standard IL approach. 
 
3.2.2 Increased focus on futures caused by ill-defined external shocks 
 
Since in IL the created scenarios describe series of causes which trigger other causes, the causes 
considered to initiate the causal sequence often represent external µshocks¶. For example, inspect the 
initial driving forces in Figure 1, two are political local government decisions (i.e., land release/zoning) 
and one is stability/instability in interest rates whose own pre-cursor could be change in global 
financial systems. Such external causation ± often conceived as weakly-specified change in the basic 
PESTEL dimensions ± is often, in practice, conceptualised by scenario workshop participants to trigger 
chains of efficient causes. This is because any deeper analysis will be both time-consuming and 
difficult. Consider, for example, a hypothetical scenario-planning exercise designed to consider the 
future of the UK economy, or one particular part of it, such as financial services (Cave et al., 2012). 
The development, by workshop participants, of precipitative chains of causation (c.f. stage 3 of the 
standard IL process, detailed earlier) will prompt consideration of efficient causes as external shocks to 
the system under scrutiny, rather than deeper-lying, endogenously-generated causes. The result will be 
the generation of both questions based on precipitative, efficient causes - such as µWhat might 
precipitate another financial crisis?¶ - and of answers also based on efficient causes - such as µA series 
of speculative bubbles and crashes¶ (c.f., Cave et al., 2012). 
 
The emphasis, demonstrated in this example is on efficient cause but the µcause¶ is demonstrably 
poorly understood: simply the inflating and bursting of a series of bubbles. This poorly-specified 
µcause¶ leaves unexplored the deeper, underlying reasons for the inflation of such bubbles, including 
the contradictions inherent in the financial system that are brought about endogenously from within the 
system itself. Even where these causes are more fully developed - as in the cited example (Cave et al., 
2012) - the tendency, in practice, is that participants focus on superficial, precipitative, trigger causes 
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rather than elaborating the underpinning generative mechanisms which create the conditions under 
which such triggers have their precipitative power. 
 
A focus on efficient cause in practical scenario workshop settings can therefore lead to a shallow 
consideration of the causal unfolding of particular futures in terms of precipitative events, rather than a 
deeper consideration of the particular system under scrutiny, which XQGHUSLQVDQHYHQW¶Vprecipitative 
power. Such superficial analysis can result in misattributions of cause (Wright and Goodwin, 2009). 
 
4 How can scenario development methodology take into consideration a broader set of causes?  
  
4.1 Incorporating a full range of Aristotelian causes 
 
$ULVWRWOH¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQV $ULVWRWOH  VKRZ WKH LVVXHRI FDXVH WREH more complex 
than the notion of efficient cause. Intuitively, if A causes B then A precedes B in time and brings it 
about. Thus, A is directly implicated in the occurrence of B, which would not occur in its absence. 
Here, cause is simply a relation that connects events (De Rond and Thietart, 2007) which occur in 
chronological order. But efficient cause is simply one of four main types of cause that Aristotle 
distinguished: known as efficient, material, formal and final. As noted, a cluster of driving forces, as 
created in Stage 3 of the standard IL scenario development method, is highly dependent on a linear, 
chronological view of causes as series of precipitative events. A focus on this type of cause, however, 
is to leave material, formal and final cause unexplored. 
 
4.2.1 Material cause: cause as transformation 
 
The original, Aristotelian conception of µmaterial cause¶ is named as such because it refers to the 
material from which something is made (Hocutt, 1974). Its material nature determines (i) its present 
state, (ii) the states to which it can transform, and (iii) the effect that particular causes can have upon it. 
For example, the material nature of wood means that its present state is solid; however, burning causes 
it to transform into ash, which is a qualitatively different material state. Notice that this is a step change 
to a different state, rather than a change in the variable level of a present state. The material nature of 
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water means that in warm temperatures it is liquid; however, freezing temperatures cause it to 
transform into ice, which is again a qualitatively different material state rather than simply a variable 
change in present state. 
 
,PSRUWDQWO\,/¶VVWDQGDUGPHWKRGWRLGHQWLI\HIILFLHQWFDXVHKDVQRH[SOLFLWFRQFHUQZLWKWKHFDXVHVRI
a step change leading to transformation. But, LQ $ULVWROH¶V DQDO\VLV material cause is of focal 
importance in understanding change. Here, the nature and importance of identifying the material cause 
of transformation from one qualitative state to another is LOOXVWUDWHGE\)XVKLQJHWDO¶V  recent 
examination of the cause of the 2008 financial crisis. These authors demonstrate that the financial crisis 
of 2008 was the result of a sudden, unintended, system-wide loss of inter-banking network connections. 
The nature of the network linking banks had shifted, over time, from one characterized by a great deal 
of hierarchical control of transactions which was centered around particularly powerful individual 
banks, to one in which control of transactions was much more distributed. This change in the control of 
the underpinning financial network caused a material, step-change, in the viability of the overall 
financial system ± it collapsed in 2008.  
 
Such observable step-changes in material states are strongly associated with the operation of complex 
systems (c.f., Orrell and McSharry, 2009). Complex systems tend to remain on particular trajectories or 
µSDWKV¶RYHUWLPHXQWLOVXFKDSRLQWWKDWQRQ-linear interactions between particular causal factors, often 
originating endogenously but fed-back by the broader system in which they occur, cause a sudden shift 
onto an alternative development path. This change is represented as a µtipping-point¶ or bifurcation 
(Byrne and Callaghan, 2014). 
 
Wilkinson et al. (2013) analysed how scenario development can benefit from the insights that 
complexity science can offer. A focus of their discussion was on systemic influences that lead to non-
linear shifts in the business environment. A key concept that they identified was that of µfeedback 
mechanisms¶ ± we will deal with this concept in detail, later, in Section 5.1.2. Wilkinson et al. argued 
that feedback mechanisms can act to magnify emergent systemic effects, thereby amplifying their 
impact. In our analysis, since emphasis in the standard IL scenario development method is 
predominantly on efficient cause, with little consideration given to material cause, there will be little 
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consideration of step-change and its causation. Makridakis and Taleb (2009, p.728) explicitly note that 
mechanical-based means for thinking about the future - which we have shown IL to be - are incapable 
of taking account of step-changesZKLFKWKH\UHIHUWRDOWHUQDWLYHO\DVµWXUQLQJSRLQWV¶. Yet, as we have 
argued, step-change underpins the unfolding of significant, yet plausible, futures. 
 
4.2.2 Formal cause: cause as design  
 
A µformal¶ notion of cause can have a number of interpretations, including natural tendencies or 
proclivities, and also formal blueprint or structure. Under the latter interpretation µformal cause¶ refers 
to what the object of causal explanation µis¶, or is intended to be (Dimov, 2011) in its true essence. 
7KXV IRUPDOFDXVHFDQEHFRQFHSWXDOLVHGDV WKH IRUPDOGHVLJQRIDQDFWRU¶VRU VWUXFWXUH¶VDFWLYLWLHs. 
)RU H[DPSOH D ORFDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V SODQQLQJ GHSDUWPHQW ZLOO GHFLGH DQG UHJXODWH RQ ODQG XVH LQ
Glasgow city - within the influence diagram presented earlier in Fig. 1. 
 
Plans or blueprints for action can be considered µformal causes¶ (De Haan, 2006). From this 
perspective, the production of a QHZO\ EXLOW KRXVH LV µFDXVHG¶ E\ LWV formal blueprint, or the 
performance of a EXVLQHVVLVµFDXVHG¶E\LWVEXVLQHVVSODQ (Dimov, 2011). Thus, the design of existing 
regulatory structures and strategic plans define and constrain the current and future activities of 
individuals and organisations. MacKay and Tambeau (2013) focused their conceptual analysis on the 
underlying basis of scenario construction and identify enduring social structures ± including cultural 
and economic systems that are governed by rules and resources ± as the major determinants of human 
actions. In so doing, they integrated µstructuration theory¶ with scenario method. Human actions are 
seen here as both constrained and facilitated by existing social and economic structures and so, these 
authors argue, the interactions between human actions and such structures are pivotal in understanding 
the way in which the future might unfold. 
 
4.2.3 Final cause: cause as motivated action 
 
µ)LQDO¶ FDXVH UHIHUV WR WKH SXUSRVH or motivation underpinning behavior. In the recent scenario 
literature, there has been an increasing emphasis on uncovering stakeholders¶viewpoints on unfolding 
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events (Cairns et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2013). Hughes (2013) focused his analysis on the role of 
scenarios in public policy making. He argued that public policy makers are often powerful and so, to a 
degree, can shape and secure the future. This level of power contrasts with the level of power that can 
be exerted by commercial organizations - where organizations often seek protection, or robustness, in 
strategy development and evaluation. Hughes' analysis identified the inter-relationships between the 
behavior of powerful, self-interested actors and the components of unfolding scenarios. He was 
concerned with the balance of both power and interests (i.e., desires and values) between actor 
groupings as these forces interact with technological capabilities and technological change. In our 
analysis, powerful stakeholders will act to preserve and enhance their own interests within particular 
unfolding scenarios. Yet the standard IL approach has been shown to have very limited emphasis on 
stakeholder concerns and predictable self-interested actions (Wright et al., 2013; Cairns et al., 2010). 
From our analysis, one reason for this is the standard IL PHWKRG¶V over-emphasis on identifying 
efficient cause rather than final cause. 
 
Consideration of power and the powerful is absent from the standard IL method of developing 
scenarios, yet power structures can block or enable change that is instigated by efficient cause. By 
considering formal cause, an understanding of individuals¶ or organizations¶ designed-in 
responsibilities and power can be analyzed. By considering final cause, the motivation of an individual 
or organization to act, and so exercise power, can be better understood.  
 
4.3 Contingent causation and countervailing factors 
 
Each of these three alternatives to efficient cause ± material, formal and final ± can be incorporated as 
augmentations into the standard IL scenario development process. Derbyshire and Wright (2014) cite 
Loasby (1999) as highlighting the provisional and tentative nature of all human notions of cause. This 
is due to countervailing factors, which may prevent a particular cause from having an effect. Recently 
the UK National Health Service introduced a phone helpline designed (formal cause) to reduce the 
patient burden on community-based general medical practitioners and hospitals. However, the 
employment of non-medically-trained call-handlers employing tick-box scripts (formal cause), rather 
than qualified doctors or nurses employing judgement (formal cause), resulted in an increased burden 
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for hospitals (efficient cause) since callers not receiving credible advice were motivated (final cause) to 
seek the expert opinion from a hospital emergency department ± and the intermediate point-of-help, the 
community general practitioner, was overlooked. All this resulted in several hospitals being categorised 
as failing (material cause). This is an exemplar illustration of how causal forces might act as 
countervailing factors that prevented an expected outcome from a designed formal cause. 
 
In short, an analysis and understanding of contingent conditions and countervailing factors is essential 
for a full realization of an unfolding future. Analysis of the interplay between the forces of efficient 
cause, material cause, formal cause, and final cause provides a comprehensive portrayal of the 
unfolding of future states of the world. As we noted earlier, in Section 1, Bradfield et al. (2005) 
identified four main areas of purpose in scenario work: making sense of a particular puzzling situation; 
developing strategy; anticipation; and adaptive organizational learning. The flexibility of the IL method 
lends itself to a wide range of scenario purposes ± either (i) descriptive or normative, and (ii) the scope 
extremely broad, as in the development of global scenarios, or narrow, if focussed on the viability of a 
single focal organization. In our analysis, our focus on the varied types of causes of transformation in 
the business environment means that our arguments and conclusions are applicable to all of the varied 
purposes inherent in scenario work (c.f., van der Heijden et al, 2002). In short, the elicitation of driving 
forces should be re-framed as a process of identifying (i) those that can cause step-change 
transformation, (ii) those whose formal design can facilitate or restrict change and, (iii) those where 
actor motivations and actions can facilitate or restrict change. 
 
5 Augmenting scenario development method 
 
In this section we outline some adaptations and augmentations to the standard IL scenario development 
process, reducing the current over-emphasis on efficient cause. We demonstrate that these changes 
transform IL from a tool predominantly focused, in practice, on efficient, precipitative causes to one 
encompassing all three alternative types of cause outlined in this paper. We set out these adaptations 
and augmentations below, linking them to the analysis of a specific alternative cause. See Table 1 for 
an overview of our augmented IL approach. 
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   INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
5.1 Uncovering material cause for transformation from a present state to a future state  
 
As we shall see, in our following proposal for an augmented Stage 1 of the IL scenario development 
process, analysis of the past can provide clues as to what type of causal relationships will tend to 
continue into the future in the focal system of influences. Yet, standard IL currently devotes little 
attention to a consideration of the present state and how it has come to be. 
 
5.1.1 Providing a detailed analysis RI WKH SUHVHQW DV D µcommon starting-point¶ for scenario 
development 
 
Stage 1 of IL, described earlier, is focused on uncovering the µLVVXH RI FRQFHUQ¶ WR WKH focal 
organization. In our analysis, this focus should be developed so as to become a more integral part of the 
scenario-planning exercise, providing the context for the future. An expanded Stage 1 should provide a 
detailed description of the µpresent state¶ of the focal system, which is then used to underpin the 
development of each subsequent scenario, providing the common starting-point for each unfolding 
chain of causation leading to sets of varying future outcomes. As part of this rich description of the 
present state, efforts should be made to understand how this present has come to be, since this analysis 
will provide causal clues as to what may occur in the future. Future causes and outcomes may vary 
compared to those of the past, but the past can nevertheless provide clues as to the types of causal 
mechanisms which are present within the focal system. 
 
To achieve this, an augmented Stage 1 should take the form of a short exercise whereby participants 
describe in detail the present situation and highlight causal factors which, in their view, have led to this 
present situation. Specifically, participants should be prompted to identify (a) those that caused step-
change transformation, (ii) those whose formal design facilitated or restricted change and, (iii) those 
where actor motivations and actions facilitated or restricted change. IL, as currently practiced, does not 
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take advantage of all the benefits to be derived from history. There is some account taken of history 
through the consideration of predetermined elements, but this focuses on what remains the same over 
time, rather than an examination of historical change and the reasons for it. Templates such as PESTEL 
(c.f., section 2.1, earlier) focus on what is immediately salient at present, providing little room for 
consideration of how things have developed over time up to the present, how one identified driving 
force may have gained in prominence over time, or how past significant changes or surprises were the 
result of particular important driving forces. In standard IL practice, described earlier, scenarios are 
constructed as developments from the present without explicit consideration of the process through 
which that present has come to be. But, what develops in the future will be influenced by the 
continuation of the causes underpinning the present. Some of the underpinning driving forces will be 
trend-based. It is worth noting that one of the seminal founders of scenario thinking also placed great 
emphasis on uncovering continuing trends (c.f. Wack, 1985). The more recent attenuation of interest in 
the continuing elements of the future is understandable because scenario planning is now viewed by 
academics and practitioners as an alternative to forecasting (van der Heijden, 2000). However, in our 
present analysis, focused search and analysis should place emphasis on identifying endogenous change 
that is brought about from within the focal system itself. In this way, developments in the future will be 
reconnected with the present and past. 
 
In many respects, this augmented approach, incorporating a much more detailed initial stage, is, we 
believe, more in keeping with scenario planning as it was originally intended. While there has been an 
exponential rise in the literature on scenario planning (Hodgkinson et al. 2006; Varum and Melo, 
2010), in reviewing the wide range of scenarios that have been developed and documented in the 
literature, the conclusion of van Asselt et al.¶V (2010) review was that most of the accounts of the 
development process were relatively short descriptions of the main steps. Consequently µchoices, 
considerations, discussions, struggles, compromises, unproductive steps, flaws, practical adjustments, 
experiments, difficulties, challenges anGORFDOVROXWLRQVDUHFRQFHDOHG¶ (van Asselt et al.., 2010, p.11). 
In keeping with this, it is our contention that most of the accounts infer that the development process is 
a relatively straightforward and linear one; little attention is given to segregating out what is 
predetermined and what is uncertain; and the nature of any perceived causality has been analysed 
superficially. This includes any focus on the role of history in understanding how the present situation 
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has come about and how it may evolve in the future. Important causes of past significant changes and 
their potential to be repeated, albeit in a different context leading to subtle but important differences in 
the way they play out, are therefore overlooked. The scenario process has become, to some extent, a 
somewhat simplistic, off-the-VKHOIWRROZKLFKDOORZVPDQDJHPHQW WRµWLFN WKHER[¶LQWHUPVRI IXWXUH
proofing and consideration of the future. The simplistic way in which the IL process has been 
documented in the major practical textbooks (see, for example, van der Heijden et al., 2002 and Wright 
and Cairns, 2011) - with the good intention of widening access to scenario practice and invoking 
discussion - may have inadvertently contributed to this. 
 
The process of creating a detailed description of the present, within an augmented Stage 1, will also 
provide a preliminary perspective on varying stakeholder views of the focal system as it currently is. 
Such views may be positive, negative or indifferent. There is nothing in the standard IL process which 
provides for the uncovering of these varying interpretations of the present state other than an initial 
discussion in Stage 1 of the µissue of concern¶ for which the scenario-planning exercise is being 
conducted. 
 
5.1.2 Enhancing the influence diagram to make it more explicitly about transformation 
 
The detailed description of a present state, resulting from an expanded Stage 1, should be referred to at 
the point that the driving forces are created at Stage 2. This would reinforce in participants that what is 
being considered is a process that involves continuation as well as change. In this way, more emphasis 
will be given to identifying pre-determined elements, as opposed to uncertainties. 
 
Influence diagrams developed at Stage 4 of the standard IL scenario development process, are 
comprised of µfundamental¶ drivers (i.e., those forces linked closely to the basic PESTEL categories) 
on the left-hand side of the diagram whose µarrows of influence¶ are directed from one subsequent 
cause to the next in a left-to-right direction, until the end-point is reached that represents the resolved 
outcome, which is usually to the right of the diagram. By including a brief analysis of the present state 
to the left of the diagram, the developed influence diagram will reinforce the scenario as one of 
stability and change in the focal system from the present to the future. Furthermore, including a 
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common starting point in this way facilitates the comparison of different influence diagrams, providing 
the context by which to consider the plausibility of alternative unfolding causal paths to the future, each 
from a commonly-agreed present. This can also assist in deciding the placement of the clusters in Stage 
5, the Stage which determines the essential basis of the narrative scenarios. 
 
Including present-state descriptions can also assist with the actual writing of scenario narratives at 
Stage 8 - since the scenario story-lines can be more easily set out in terms of an explicit starting-point 
and an explicit end-point. The left-hand side of Figure 3 provides an example of such an augmented 
influence diagram for the level of growth of inner-city housing in Glasgow that we presented earlier in 
Figure 1. 
 
   INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Indeed, the housing strategies of local authorities in the UK, as incorporated in the example in Figure 3, 
provides a currently highly salient further example of why it is important to take account of the broad 
range of causes we have argued for. As another, contrasting, housing example, consider the housing 
issue in London ± located 350 miles south of Glasgow. Recently, much has been written about the 
µKRXVLQJ FULVLV¶ IDFLQJ /RQGRQ There are a broad range of causes of this crisis and these causes 
encompass all four of the aspects of cause we have highlighted ± efficient, material, formal and final. A 
highly simplistic analysis based purely on efficient cause would perhaps identify sharp increases in rent 
as the direct cause of the crisis, perhaps precipitated by insufficient supply of new housing. A more 
nuanced causal analysis would unpick the underlying factors contributing to this lack of supply. As 
discussed by Foster (2015), the causes of the housing crisis include insufficient availability of land 
(material cause), which is exacerbated by planning regulations and bureaucracy (formal cause), making 
it difficult to build on what little land there is available. The resulting constraint in housing supply has 
now been further exacerbated by the UK governmenW¶V µ5LJKW WREX\¶VFKHPHIRUPDOFDXVHZKLFK
allows tenants in local government social housing to purchase the property they rent. Local authorities 
are then expected to use the money raised through this to build replacement social housing. However, 
in some areas, especially in London, as noted, there is no land available for this (material cause) and, 
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HOVHZKHUHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHUHYHQXHUDLVHGIURPVHOOLQJDµ5LJKWWREX\¶SURSHUW\DQGWKHFRVW
of building a new property is so large ± not least during a period of austerity ± that local authorities 
cannot afford to build the replacement property that is required (material cause). As a result, local 
authorities in London have had to return £250m in revenue raised from selling social housing to central 
government because they have been unable to spend it on building replacement social housing. Finally, 
these problems are further exacerbated by foreign investors buying property or land, which then 
remains empty or unbuilt on, simply as an investment, essentially banking the property or land and 
waiting for prices to increase. They are motivated to do this by rapidly increasing land and house prices 
(final cause). This action by investors then has the effect of further increasing house prices, making it 
still more desirable to buy and withhold houses and land, in the circular fashion of a causal loop 
leading to transformation (in this case, the transformation from a situation of adequate supply to a 
housing crisis). 
 
Of course, some of these causes in our London example, above, and also, by contrast, in our Glasgow 
example in Figure 3, might anyway be identified through a PESTEL analysis  (c.f., section 2.2)  and so 
picked up by a scenario planning exercise that employs the standard IL approach as it is currently 
constituted. However, by rendering explicit the four different types of causes and adapting the IL 
process specifically to uncover them, as described below, there is a greater likelihood of the full range 
of important causes being uncovered. Moreover, consideration of the category of cause ± as in the 
Glasgow example in Figure 3 - assists in the process of understanding how the various causes combine 
to bring about a (in the London case) negative transformation and how strategies can be put in place to 
mitigate, or potentially reverse, the effects of this. Interactions between causes can be better understood 
when causal types are identified)RUH[DPSOH WKH µFDXVH¶ UHODWHG WRDVFOHURWLFSODQQLQJV\VWHPDQG
excessive bureaucracy might be mitigated by a one-off release of a large amount of available land - 
such as brownfield (i.e., former industrial land) or greenfield ± through a planning process specifically 
put in place to be minimal and to allow release of this land for development as soon as possible. 
However, if the final cause of an incentive for foreign investors to buy and hold on to development 
land is not simultaneously addressed, addressing the formal cause related to the planning system and its 
bureaucracy may do little to alleviate the problem. To resolve the problem, leading to a transformation 
back to non-crisis conditions, requires a combination of actions to address each of the different types of 
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causes, taken in combination. Understanding the nature of these different causes assists in thinking this 
through and thinking through the effect of actions taken to resolve one cause on the other causes. An 
action taken to resolve a particular cause may actually exacerbate one of the other causes, causing the 
crisis to worsen rather than improve, because of complex and contingent causation and the causal 
interaction this leads to. 
 
5.1.3 Analysing the potential for transformation ± material cause 
 
As noted above, influence diagrams constructed as part of IL currently tend to be comprised of causes 
OLQNHG E\ µDUURZV RI LQIOXHQFH¶ ZKLFK UXQ IURP OHIW-to-right in a linear fashion, reinforcing ,/¶V 
determinism, which we have earlier associated with its focus on efficient cause. Causal looping, in 
which a cause and its effect are shown to influence each other, are not a common or standard feature in 
IL influence diagrams. But, in our view, the importance of causal loops should be made explicit to 
scenario workshop participants and such loops should be included in influence diagrams whenever 
possible in order to dilute determinism and to emphasise that transformational change can emerge 
through self-reinforcing positive feedback. Such positive feedback, as represented by causal loops, may 
lead to tipping points and bifurcations, which are the very essence of a step-change in the nature of the 
future, whether viewed positively or negatively. 
 
In Figure 3, we have added such a loop between WKH GULYLQJ IRUFH ODEHOOHG µ6WDELOLW\LQVWDELOLW\ RI
inteUHVW UDWHV¶DQG WKDW ODEHOOHGµ'HJUHHRIFRQILGHQFH LQKRXVLQJPDUNHW¶ ± since the two will affect 
each other, leading, potentially, to positive feedback. For example, a volatile housing market that 
booms and crashes leads to instability in interest rates, which then feeds back and affects confidence in 
the housing market. As in Figure 3, influence diagrams may include multiple such self-reinforcing or 
circular causal relationships ± some with the potential to cause transformational material change. 
 
5.2 Uncovering the impact of formal and final causation 
 
Wright et al. (2013) have emphasised the importance of placing an enhanced stakeholder analysis at the 
heart of scenario development methodology so as to challenge conventional thinking and ensure that a 
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greater heterogeneity of viewpoints are discussed. Similarly, Wright and Goodwin (2009) have argued 
for a more intense focus on stakeholder analysis in scenario development, with a particular focus on 
analysing stakeholderV¶DFWLRQV Wo preserve and enhance their own interests as events in the PESTEL 
environment unfold by efficient cause (Wright et al., 2013). This new emphasis in scenario 
development is in accord with our own emphasis on evaluating the effects of final cause. Beinhocker 
(1997, 2006) noted that traditional economic theory is analogous to Newtonian physics and is not a 
valid predictor of behaviour. By contrast, the recent emphasis within economics on behavioural 
economics focuses on understanding of human psychology, as does our present focus on understanding 
final cause. However, our present analysis adds a nuance ± the self-interested actions of powerful 
stakeholders will be affected, i.e., facilitated or restricted by formal cause: e.g., regulations, legal 
requirements, institutional structures, organizational missions, etc. 
 
As we have discussed in this paper, consideration of the future requires a realisation that there are both 
multiple possible futures and multiple possible paths to each of these. Actions by the powerful may 
shift the course of events onto an alternative pathway but, since there are multiple paths to each future, 
this does not necessarily imply the avoidance of an undesirable future. Additionally, analysis of 
stakeholder motivations and power and structural constraints will reveal the potential for contingent 
and countervailing cause which may enable or countervail any intended goal. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
7KH HIILFDF\RI WKH µVWDQGDUG¶ ,/ DSSURDFK WR VFHQDrio planning has recently been questioned in the 
scenario-planning literature. In this paper we have added to this debate by identifying additional 
deficiencies in the standard development approach: its practice-based inherent determinism leads to a 
perspective-narrowing effect. Scenario planning is purportedly a technique which denies the possibility 
of prediction, offering instead an alternative means for thinking about the future based on plausibility. 
Yet IL is, in fact, focussed on prediction ± but within each particular scenario. This µmechanical¶ basis, 
DVHYLGHQFHGE\,/¶VHPSKDVLVRQXQFRYHULQJµGULYLQJIRUFHV¶ results in an over-emphasis on one type 
of cause, known as efficient cause, leading to deterministic scenarios based on precipitative cause-and-
effect pathways into the future. 
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In this paper, we have highlighted the dangers associated with an over-emphasis on efficient cause in 
scenario development. These include the misimpression that each possible future has a single set of 
antecHGHQWFDXVHV OHDGLQJLQ WXUQWRDPLVLPSUHVVLRQDVWRWKHXVHIXOQHVVRI µZHDNVLJQDOV¶RUµHDUO\
ZDUQLQJV¶ a misimpression that is currently prevalent in the horizon-scanning literature, as we have 
discussed. 
 
In response to these issues and problems with the standard IL approach, we proposed augmentations to 
the standard IL approach which, when employed together, provide for a broader consideration of cause 
in terms of transformation, structuration, and human motivations - incorporating three additional types 
of cause: material, formal and final. The suggested augmentations also provide a lens to consider 
countervailing factors and contingent conditions where the different types of cause, and causal agents, 
may act in conjunction, or in opposition, to the effects of efficient cause. The latter analysis and 
resulting insights are important since they are a central source of perceived indeterminism, resulting in 
expected causal relationships ± as uncovered by a superficial efficient-cause-focussed analysis  -  
failing to play out in the expected way. By our analysis, it is crucial to consider countervailing factors 
and contingent-conditions when constructing scenarios of the future, since only in this way will 
participants in scenario development exercises gain a full insight into the underpinning causation of 
unfolding futures. 
 
In terms of expert knowledge elicitation practice, our application of AristotOH¶V Quanced analysis of 
cause enables both the decomposition and evaluation of the reasons underpinning a particular judgment 
or prediction ± HJ WKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWQH[W\HDU¶VOHYHORIJURZWK LQLQQHU-city housing in Glasgow 
will be greater than 10% (c.f., Figure 1), or the probability that at least one supermarket chain will offer 
residential mortgages in the coming year, etc (c.f., Wright and Cairns, 2011, p49).  Recall that the 
common focus of expert knowledge elicitation  methods are WRTXDQWLI\H[SHUWV¶VLQJOH-point-estimates 
RI XQFHUWDLQ TXDQWLWLHV ZLWK VRPH H[SHUWV¶ MXGJPHQWV SRWHQWLDOO\ EHLQJ given more weight in the 
combination. Elicitation and explication of the causal reasoning underpinning proffered estimates will 
allow one expert to both consider and then, perhaps, defer to the reasoning of another expert ± thus 
allowing self-regulated weighting of indiviGXDOV¶ RSLQLRQV DQG MXGJPHQWV)XWXUH XVHRI Whis type of 
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enhanced reasoning-appreciation -and-evaluation procedure is supported by the results of extant 
research on the use of the Delphi technique for the aggregation of individual opinions. In this research, 
the exchange of the rationales for particular opinions has been show to improve the validity of the 
Delphi yield - for a discussion of the research on this issue see Bolger and Wright (2011) and for 
proposals to link the Delphi outcome research to the EKE literature see Bolger and Rowe (2014, 2015). 
 
 In work-shop-based applications of scenario planning, informal aggregation of expert opinions will 
also be enhanced by the elicitation of SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ underpinning ³ULFK´UHDVRQLQJbefore the facilitated 
convergence of individual opinions into separable scenario storylines. As such, use of our practical 
DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $ULVWRWOH¶V QXDQFHG GHFRPSRVLWLRQ RI FDXVDOLW\ ZLOO DLG WKRVH participating in expert 
groups to scrutinise the reasoning underpinning particular anticipations of the future.  
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Fig. 1 Example of an influence diagram produced at Stage 3 LQ D µUHDO-OLIH¶ standard IL scenario 
planning exercise 
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Fig. 2 Two high impact, high uncertainty, clusters that concerned the senior managers of a major 
European bank in the last quarter of 2007 
 
  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Interest-only time-bomb? 
Has underperforming assets 
No Assets 
E.g. Policies 
Ageing population 
Remortgage 
Has unpaid 
mortgages 
New products/Criteria 
for older people 
Sell/Downsize? 
Will continue to pay 
interest of rent 
Option of let-to-buy New mortgage/ 
Products 
Rent 
New risk profiles 
New products 
Health of broker channel 
Regulation changes Longer term 
mortgage deals 
Less churn 
Different direct 
channels (Tesco) 
Less broker 
demand 
Technology and 
confidence allows 
customer to buy 
direct 
New products for all 
market segments 
Recovering margins for 
banks 
35 
 
Tab. 1 Contrasting the Conventional and Augmented Intuitive Logics Approach to Scenario 
Development 
 
Stage Conventional IL approach Augmented IL approach 
Stage 1: Setting the scenario agenda Defining the issue of concern and process, and 
setting the scenario timescale. 
Developing a detailed 
analysis of the present ± 
see section 5.1.1 - that 
incorporates identification 
of material, formal and 
final cause, as well as 
efficient cause. 
Stage 2: Determining the driving 
forces 
Eliciting a multiplicity of wide-ranging forces. Prompting  identification 
of material, formal and 
final cause as well as 
efficient cause 
Stage 3: Clustering the driving 
forces 
Clustering causally-related driving forces, 
testing and naming the clusters. 
Focusing on 
transformation by 
prompting identification of 
material, formal and final 
cause, as well as efficient 
cause. 
Stage 4 Defining the cluster 
outcomes 
Defining two extreme, but plausible and hence 
possible, outcomes for each of the clusters over 
the scenario timescale. 
The extreme scenarios are 
likely to become more 
extreme because of the 
augmented Stage 3. 
Stage 5: Impact/uncertainty matrix Ranking each of the clusters to determine the 
critical uncertainties i.e. those clusters which 
have both the most impact on the issue of 
concern and also the highest degree of 
uncertainty as to their resolution as outcomes. 
No change. 
Stage 6: Framing the scenarios Selecting two initial critical uncertainties to 
create a scenario matrix, framing the scenarios 
by defining the extreme outcomes of the 
uncertainties. 
No change. 
Stage 7: Scoping the scenarios Building a broad set of descriptors for each of 
the four scenarios. 
Prompting identification of 
causal loops. 
Stage 8: Developing the scenarios Developing scenario storylines, including key 
events, their chronological structure, and the 
µZKRDQGZK\¶RIZKDWKDSSHQV 
The scenarios are likely to 
emphasize radical 
transformational change 
because of the augmented 
Stages 3 and 7. 
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Fig. 3 An influence diagram from a causally-augmented IL scenario planning 
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